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SHYLOCK, CORDELIA, AND THE MAINE DISTRICT
COURT
John C. Sheldon*
In Maine there are two different state trial courts. The superior court is the
jury trial forum, to which most people refer valuable civil and weighty criminal
issues. The district court, on the other hand, is the "peoples' court," where judges
decide cases without juries in order to provide litigants with a fast track to the
resolution of their simpler (or, at least, less consequential) civil and criminal cases.
Maine District Court judges rarely grapple with grand constitutional issues like
abortion or free speech, they hardly ever encounter flashy murder cases, and they
never participate in headline products liability trials. Instead, they spend most of
their time hearing misdemeanors, juvenile offenses, traffic violations, domestic
violence and family law cases, and small claims.
A consequence of such a court structure is the perception that the district court
is an inferior judicial branch. There are two straightforward reasons for this. First,
the court that regularly handles cases that involve more money, or more prison
time, looks more important. Second, the superior court has the authority to review
many district court decisions on appeal-a fact that automatically indicates the
courts' inequality.
A third reason, however, is more subtle. The district court is supposed to
attract the litigants who want, or can only afford, to represent themselves. Few of
these pro se parties have ever studied the law that applies to their cases. While that
may be okay some of the time-for example, there isn't much law to figure out in
a fishing-without-a-license case-it's frequently problematic; for much of the dis-
trict court docket, especially in family law and many small claims, the law can be
downright labyrinthine. Most pro se litigants don't anticipate these legal intrica-
cies because they assume that the "people's court" is going to be user-friendly. To
say that they suffer disappointment when they unexpectedly run afoul of refrac-
tory legal doctrines like the parole evidence rule or res judicata understates the
truth. In fact, many of them view such complexity as lawyers' trickiness, and they
distrust it.
To minimize such parties' suspicions and to help them understand his or her
decision, a district court judge must avoid appearing to have rested the decision on
any abstruse legal ground. From that perspective, a judge who wants to get techni-
cal with district court cases appears to be playing in the wrong league: You can't
nibble at the corners with your breaking stuff, you've got to put it right down the
middle of the plate every time. As a result, the Maine District Court has gotten the
reputation as a place of unsophisticated litigants and rough justice where legal
analysis merely slows people down and legal abstractions infuriate them. There is,
it has been said, nothing superior about the law in the district court.
Because I used to agree with that assessment, I never liked my job. Judging in
the district courts of western Maine seemed to require no intellectual sophistica-
tion of me whatsoever. Instead, all it seemed to take was stamina enough to main-
tain my headway against an unrelenting torrent of poorly educated, often surly and
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occasionally fetid litigants. Even more discouraging was the redundancy of it all,
the inability or unwillingness of these people to vary their misery. What I was
supposed to judge, it seemed, was the same old themes repeated with numbing
frequency: a creditor insisting that I miraculously collect the loan he extended to a
debtor on welfare; the headstrong teenager expecting that emancipation from her
equally obstinant parents will solve her problems; the eternally forgiving victim
who forces dismissal of a domestic violence complaint because she refuses, yet
again, to testify against her vicious boyfriend; the unreformed alcoholic who pays
for his denial with regular installments of legal humiliation; teenage parents argu-
ing about which of them is the less-unqualified custodian for their infant; feuding
neighbors who think that a cease-harassment order will do any good. A cornuco-
pia of petulance, a wasteland of ignorance, I thought.
I thought that for almost the entire seven years of my firstjudicial term. Then,
suddenly, a change: they assigned me to hear the case of a fourteen-year-old girl
who was accused of murdering her kindly aunt by stabbing her 106 times. In the
strictest sense, all I had to do was decide whether to order the girl to stand trial as
a juvenile or as an adult, and that wasn't hard. The mandatory minimum sentence
for murder by one tried as an adult is twenty-five years in the Maine State Prison,
and I didn't think that it was fair to expose a fourteen-year-old to that. Much more
difficult was the task of convincing the public that my decision was reasonable, a
problem born of the brutality of this crime and compounded by the retributive
mood of our times. I knew I could expect tar and feathers if my position were not
both persuasive and impregnable. So I supported the decision with citations to
Lincoln and Churchill-to make it harder for my critics to call me a wimp--and I
quoted Shakespeare--to make it harder to call me stupid.
I built the critical portion of the decision around Portia's famous speech about
merciful justice from act 4, scene I of The Merchant of Venice: "The quality of
mercy is not strain'd, It droppeth as the gentle rain from heaven .... ." But I didn't
want to risk quoting Portia out of context, so I read the play before I completed the
decision. In the process, I encountered Shylock, futilely trying to convince ajudge
to help him collect a debt. A light went on: Another of my many frustrated credi-
tors? Curious, I pulled out King Lear, and found this: Lear is so pig-headed that
he won't acknowledge his daughter Cordelia's unvarnished devotion to him, and
Cordelia is so stubborn that she refuses to express her devotion the way he wants
to hear it. Disregarding their eminent, mutual affection, he throws her out (inci-
dentally sealing their fate) because they can't communicate. Another light went
on: That's every emancipation, and almost every divorce, I've ever heard. I pulled
out Othello: Husband punching and then murdering his adoring wife. The Taming
of the Shrew: The bibulous Christopher Sly drinks himself into well-deserved hu-
miliation. Romeo and Juliet: Imagine the custody and harassment battle had the
teenage lovers survived and produced a child.
Good God. I discovered that that wasteland I'd been griping about actually
teems with the elements of classic drama! The Maine District Court abounds with
behaviors worthy of Shakespeare's imagination-and none of it inspired me? I
dove back into his plays and discovered Casca, Brutus's co-conspirator in Julius
Caesar. In act 1, scene 2, Casca has watched Mark Antony work Rome's plebe-
ians into a frenzy by offering to crown Caesar as emperor. Amid this turmoil
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Caesar collapses, probably a victim of epilepsy. Casca later sneers to Brutus about
what looked to him like the plebeians' bovine pliability, and blames Caesar's black-
out on the stench of the unwashed crowd.
I had to pause. That sure sounded a lot like me, affronted by the squalid
litigants of the district court. And what sounded like me also bore the repelling
tone of snobbery. I squirmed, uncomfortable with my bedfellow Casca. But dis-
comfort, it turned out, yielded enlightenment. I came to realize that my urgent
pursuit of intellectual challenge in the district court had given me a haughtiness
that I didn't even recognize because my intellectualization had also blocked my
self-awareness. Furthermore, my emphasis on intellect-deduction, logic, and
inference-had blinded me to the district court's bouillabaisse of human behavior.
To put it another way, I'd been confronting characters who would have appealed
not only to Shakespeare but also to Dickens and Hardy and Victor Hugo and Breugel,
and I didn't know it. Stressing reason, I'd missed the potential for art.
What was the matter with me? Art's good. So why not give it a chance: forget
thinking, pry the legal carapace off the cases you're hearing and find the emotional
issues fueling the litigation. Start feeling your way through cases. I first tried it in
a speeding case. As in most speeding cases, here the officer had used radar, which
is presumed accurate under Maine law. In other words, the analysis required of me
would normally be minimal, the likelihood of conviction high, and the process
boring. This time, however, instead of simply calculating the probative value of
the evidence, I encouraged the defendant to tell me what was bothering her about
the case, and after she did we talked about it. It turns out that she viewed the
allegation that she had violated the law not as objectively untrue but rather as a
humiliating attack on her self-respect. That, of course, was alien to her evidentiary
burden, and I had to find her guilty. But I believe that by taking an interest in her
personal distress I enabled her to leave the courtroom with the confidence that
she'd been treated fairly. From my perspective, I reached the real issue within the
legal one.
That experience was immensely satisfying. What I had done wasn't inferior
to standard legal analysis at all. Finding out why people behave the way they do
was at least as difficult and far more interesting. I tried it again, and found that it
applies to all kinds of cases: how do I convince this creditor to stop throwing good
time and money at a bad debt; why does a father expect me to get his daughter to
listen to him if he can't; what can I do, besides jailing him, to discourage a defen-
dant from getting drunk or battering his girlfriend again; if my repeated orders to
cease harassment fail, is there something else I can do to diminish these neighbors'
bickering?
And then, finally, I discovered this ultimate irony: my focus on the personal
and emotional side of litigation turns out to be a useful tool for legal analysis.
Nobody could have been more surprised than I to learn that what helps me iron out
the problems of ordinary district court litigants also helps me analyze complicated
legal problems, especially issues of modem family law. For example, the purpose
of alimony in divorce is a problem that has been puzzling jurists for at least the
past decade. One reason why nobody understands alimony these days, I believe, is
because the statutes and case law about it don't reflect how people behave today.
In Maine, at least, they reflect how people behaved a century ago. Another reason
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is because many academic authorities, who sedulously research the legal literature
in an effort to define the cutting edge of family law theory, fall short because they
ignore sociology. They don't know how real families really act, so their ideas
about family lav remedies like alimony prove sterile. At least in family law, you
can't work from theory down; to be realistic, you have to start by understanding
current behavioral norms and then work up.
It's in the district courtroom that you encounter that real behavior and begin to
identify those norms. The Maine District Court is a crucible for emerging law.
Given the modem significance and interrelationship of common district court is-
sues like divorce, family, domestic violence, gender equality, sexual choice, sub-
stance abuse, and the needs of the poor, I believe that my daily district court fare
contains the fundamental ingredients of future social justice. The reason why the
ordinary people who slug it out in district court fascinate an ardent intellectualizer
like me is because they and I are forging the laws of the next generation.
I reflect on what propelled me to this conclusion. It's a long way from Shy-
lock and Cordelia to alimony for husbands. Who was that sixteenth century guy
with an imagination to enlighten a twenty-first century judge? Bill Shakespeare-
whoever you were, however you did it-thanks. You showed me what a great job
I've got.
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